Section 6 of "A Defense of Bestiality"
Let’s workshop the sixth section of an essay defending the moral permissibility of bestiality under certain circumstances, a section centering around the issue of consent
Sections 1 and 2 can be found here.
Section 3 can be found here.
Section 4 can be found here.
Section 5 can be found here.
A Defense of Bestiality
Dedicated to Gary Varner
6. Animal-Wellbeing Case
6.1. Argument
Bestiality is morally impermissible, so more and more people now argue, because it negatively impacts the wellbeing of animals, whether by violating their welfare (that is, inflicting unnecessary suffering to which they do not consent) or by violating their rights (fundamentally, the right not to be treated as mere objects bereft of personal interests).[i] Beirne states the idea as follows.
Bestiality should be understood as interspecies sexual assault. . . . [S]exual assault on an animal by a human is a harm that is objectionable for the same reasons as is an assault on one human by another—because it involves coercion, because it produces pain and suffering and because it violates the rights of another being.[ii]
The basic animal-wellbeing argument against bestiality should be clear.
1. If bestiality violates the wellbeing of animals, then bestiality is morally impermissible.
2. Bestiality violates the wellbeing of animals.
Therefore, bestiality is morally impermissible.
This argument has several key strengths. Saying that bestiality violates animal wellbeing is, unlike what we saw in earlier arguments, a directly relevant reason for its immorality. This argument, furthermore, better reflects contemporary culture, aligning with the recent shift in ethical and legal discourse around bestiality, a shift—one I find overdue, even if it is largely gum flap—from rejecting it on human-debasement grounds to rejecting it on animal-cruelty grounds.
So premise 1 seems hard to deny on the reasonable assumption that animals have moral status—reasonable, of course, since animals are sentient agents with various interests and a fundamental stake in their security. But what about premise 2? The opponent of bestiality might offer the following cumulative defense, revolving essentially around the issue of consent.
(1) Even in cases where it fails to cause damage or humiliation, bestiality involves treating an animal as a mere means to our own ends. If animals were like hammers, which have no goals of their own, then perhaps it would not be wrong to treat them as if their value were merely instrumental to our own goals. But animals have goals of their own, as well as the agency to figure out effective ways to fulfill those goals. As creatures, in effect, with inherent worth, they deserve dignity and respect (rather than being reduced to sex toys).[iii]
(2) Engaging in sexual activities with animals exploits their inability to communicate consent. Consent makes the difference between rape and non-rape in the case of humans. The same principle applies to animals. But animals cannot consent. They do not have enough cognitive power to decide whether they are okay with engaging in sex. Hence sex with animals is wrong even in the absence of pain. Rape need neither hurt nor be pleasureless to be rape.[iv]
(3) Animals, like small children, do not comprehend the implications of sexual activity even when they are receptive and acting in alignment with their preferences in the moment. Their autonomy, in that case, is endangered any time they are in sexual situations with humans.[v]
(4) Humans have physical and intellectual capabilities that animals lack. That does not change even in cases where animals enjoy sexual activity with humans, enjoy it enough to pursue it out of overwhelming desire and love. The power differential is particularly pertinent in cases involving domesticated animals. Relying on humans for nourishment and shelter, they lack the power to put a stop to sexual activities with humans. But the power to actively resist plays a crucial role in consent.[vi]
(5) Even when animals appear to doing what they want to do in sexual encounters with humans, we can never be certain of their willingness since they are of a different species. Hence we can never be sure we are not negatively impacting the animal’s wellbeing when we interact with them sexually.[vii]
6.2. Response
The cases outlined in section 2 (Cases 4, 7, 8, and 11, in particular) show that bestiality need not negatively impact animal wellbeing. In none of these cases of mutually-voluntary and mutually-pleasurable sexual activity is anyone being treated inhumanely or as if they were not moral agents with interests and goals. Case 8 stands out as an example where such sexual activity even contributes, as do other socially-accepted forms of love contact (snuggling, kissing, petting), to the development of a meaningful interpersonal relationship marked by mutual emotional growth. Since the welfare and autonomy of all parties are being respected in these cases, and since these cases raise no red-flags of power imbalance or cruelty or exploitation, there seems no reason to address the intricacies of the rationale given for premise 2.
Questioning whether such cases are problematic when it comes to animal welfare feels so ridiculous to me, however, that one might worry about my ability to maintain a level head on the matter. Full disclosure, I do struggle in this regard. Using animals as our ploughing slaves and castrating them and eating them, okay—there is definitely debate there. But simply letting them, on their own accord, lick our vagina? That form of bonding plummets to the depths of moral depravity whereas letting them lick our face—nonsexually, of course—is perfectly kosher? Huh!? It seems we have yet another case where sex has made us idiotic, as in when we are totally fine with kids watching people’s heads get blown away each day on TV and yet draw the line—as if their very salvation depended on it—at allowing them to see a penis on screen. But if only because of my level of potentially reason-swamping conviction on the matter, I will gather myself and respond to each aspect of the presented rationale.
First, it is said that bestiality involves treating an animal as a mere means to our own ends. But to use this as grounds to say ultimately that bestiality is morally impermissible is suspect.
(1) Bestiality need not involve using an animal as a mere means. Cases 4-12, especially Cases 7-9 (where the animal’s goals and autonomy are integral to the interaction), make this clear.
(2) Many apparently permissible actions involve, so it seems, treating an animal as a mere means: we house them in zoos and slaughter them for food (often after subjecting them to distressing conditions—sometimes even, as in the case of foie-gras production, to enhance their taste). The opponent of bestiality might say, “Yes, and these practices are immoral too!” Even so (and I do think that conclusion is defensible), the first point applies: some cases of bestiality are clearly reciprocal, where the animal’s goals and purposes are being respected before during and after.
(3) I am willing to insult my intellectual conscience by granting that the slaughter of animals for food does not involve treating animals as mere means but rather is more like the interaction between a patient and the dentist: the patient uses the dentist as a means to fix their teeth and the dentist uses the patient as a means to earn a living. We might say, to try to make this analogy somewhat plausible, that the animals are paid ahead of time for their flesh: they receive care and shelter in exchange for their eventual suffering and “surrender” of life. But if slaughtering factory-farmed animals—or any animals for that matter—need not count as using them as a mere means, then surely bestiality need not either.
Second, it is said that animals cannot give consent. But to use this as grounds to say ultimately that bestiality is morally impermissible is suspect.
(1) Animals are capable of communicating consent and dissent. As ranchers and equine therapists and veterinarians (and anyone with commonsense) will tell you, horses clearly indicate their likes and dislikes through distinct sounds and postures. More importantly, they give okay-to-proceed signals and do-not-proceed signals[viii]—signals that often suffice, by the way, for consent in human-to-human sexual interactions.[ix] Even lacking the ability to give any sophisticated signals (and horses do have many, for those in the know), a caring human lover—sensitive both to the animal’s cues and the ethical issues surrounding bestiality—will let the animal lead the way (or at least refrain from interfering with its own agential pursuits).[x]
(2) It is crucial to nip in the bud a standard misconception that arises in this context. “If behavioral cues suffice for consent in the case of animals,” so runs the standard misconception, “then that implies something abominable: that behavioral cues—a steady erection and giggles of pleasure, say—suffice for consent in the case of a toddler whose guardian is performing fellatio on him.”[xi] Why this is a misconception should be clear. There are relevant differences between the toddler and the animal that block the stated implication.
(a) The toddler has not reached a stage of hormonal maturation allowing for sexual desire. His erection reflects merely a change in blood flow. True behavioral consent, we might say in this case (although I remain skeptical), requires more than the outward signs of physical arousal: it requires as well the hormonal capacity for sexual desire.
(b) The toddler has a future of radically advanced socio-cognitive awareness and agential power, a future in which there is—especially given our culture, which considers being touched sexually by an adult one of the worst traumas—a strong likelihood for him to feel that any behavioral consent he gave in his underdeveloped state was insufficient to make the interaction acceptable.
(c) If in his adult stage he happens to retain memories of the fellatio performed on him, it is likely—considering mainly our social values—that these memories would cause profound emotional harm, would make him feel enraged and violated (likely more than many adults do today when reflecting on the fact that they were circumcised as children or had to suffer through so much secondhand smoke from their parents).
(d) Regardless of the societal values or his later feelings, it seems reasonable to say that the toddler should be “in his right mind”—that is, roughly in the fullest state of awareness we can expect someone of his species to achieve—before making the decision to allow fellatio to be performed upon him. Otherwise he would be signing up for something before his human program, so to say, finishes booting up to the point where it is the most aware it is ever going to be about what is being signed up for.[xii]
The orangutan in Case 7, who penetrates the woman according to his own uncoerced plan, is not in the same situation. Aside from the fact that the orangutan does not share the toddler’s physical helplessness and associated need for protection, there is no realistic possibility that the orangutan will be harmed by memories of him pitching away in the primatologist. He is oblivious to our social taboos. He could care less about our hangups around sex, unmoved by what we regard as indecent. He is also at the peak of his powers of self-governance and awareness. Knowing these facts, a conscientious human would not rely solely on body language as an indicator of consent in the case of a toddler even if he does in the case of animals. Humans need only obtain consent from animals in the way that those animals can give it. But that does not mean that humans need only obtain consent from humans in the way that animals can give it.[xiii]
(3) Because animals can consent, the term “rape” should not be applied to all instances of bestiality. Cases 7-9 clearly do not involve animal rape. The same goes for most of the others. It is not as if the turtle in Case 6 would be distraught to learn what the man did. It does not give a damn about the sexual taboos of human society. If we take the perspective of the animal, the focus is on pleasure and excitement as well as on avoiding pain or stress or disruption in goals or death.[xiv] That is why there is no rape, for example, in Case 10, where the man sucks off the frustrated dog. The dog, able to dissent at any point, gets pleasure while not being coerced in any way. So long as the sexual activity respects the animal’s boundaries and adheres to their standards of non-injurious and non-distressing engagement (standards that humans do not necessarily share, as we see in cases of BDSM), everything is kosher. To say that the sex is indefensible on grounds that the dog cannot give informed consent is either to ignore that the dog’s consent is sufficiently informed (which I think it is) or else to hold the dog to standards improper for its interests and concerns as well as for its powers of cognition and perceptual awareness—a move as blatantly game-rigging as holding an infant to standards of reading comprehension proper for a twelfth-grader. Besides, requiring the dog to provide that level of consent would render its sexual interactions with other dogs morally impermissible, which is clearly going too far. Case 8 really brings the point home. The dolphin here leads the way, doing the dolphin equivalent of rose petals to the bedroom. And on top of consenting to the act (indeed, with such expressions of high-order reasoning that it is hard not to see her as giving rational consent), she holds the power in the waters anyway. She can dip away even when he is hitting his vinegar strokes. Rather than being taken advantage of, the dolphin’s goals and purposes—as with the swimmer’s—are being carried out live in the carnal interaction.
(4) As if completely out of our minds, people cut the testicles off horny dogs to stop their sexual advances and yet say, in virtually the same breath, that letting dogs—without coercion and acting on their own accord—penetrate human vaginas is one of the ultimate sins since—get this!—“Dogs can’t consent.” What bold—all-too-cretin-like—hypocrisy! Such a violation of our intellectual conscience (our special gift, many believe, from God) seems, so I might say if I were religious, a greater blasphemy of God and God’s standards for us than fornicating with a consenting animal could ever be. Look at it this way. Many would say it is not immoral for a person to nail horse shoes into horse hooves without securing the horse’s permission through okay-to-proceed cues—yes, even with the help of ropes and Cosby sedatives. Many would say it is unproblematic to do what is most commonly done when gelding a horse (“to reduce its aggression” and “to improve its behavior”): namely, restraining it in place so that it cannot get away—yes, even despite cues that its boundaries are being disrespected (irreversibly) and that it is in pain. Many would say it is morally acceptable that professionals be called in to “fix” or “break” horses resistant to being haltered and saddled—yes, even if such “fixing” or “breaking” involves forcing them to accept the lesser of two evils by means of punishments packaged, so goes the HR-cold euphemism we use to sleep better, as a matter of “establishing authority.” But if these activities are morally permissible, surely Cases 4-12 are as well.[xv] To highlight the point to the fullest extent, many who reject bestiality wholesale on consent grounds eat animals—yes, even though one of the deepest drives, that of self-preservation, makes animals dissent to the highest degree that could ever be expressed in the biological world whenever their lives are endangered. People who kill and eat animals and yet who reject all bestiality on consent grounds are just flapping at the lips, groping to say anything—even flagrant hypocrisies—to preserve the cherished taboos protecting (through mere delusion) their insecure sense of specialness. Most of us think, I imagine, that humans have moral obligations toward animals. But if—and despite the slap-in-the-cow-face fact that nonanimal sources of protein and iron and vitamin B12 are accessible—we are not violating moral obligations by killing cows (killing them for food, say, rather than out of malice), then surely we are not violating such moral obligations by allowing—here too out of no malice—the dog of its own accord to take us from behind. Mutual respect for wellbeing and for one another’s interests are honored in the latter case but seemingly not in the former case.
(5) As we have seen, we do not think consent is required when making use of animals in various ways we consider morally permissible—yes, even in ways that involve their torture and death. You know what makes this even more perplexing? If a sober adult human verbally consents (repeatedly over years) to having done to him the sorts of things routinely done to clearly-dissenting animals (eating them, say), many legal codes and ethicists would say the consent here—despite being informed and verbal—does not matter: the activity (the killing and eating) is still a crime and immoral.[xvi] A common explanation why people think consent is not required when making use of animals—indeed, why the same people who think that it is immoral to eat a consenting human think at the same time that it is not immoral to eat a dissenting animal—is that animals do not have the same level of consciousness as humans and so do not enjoy the same rights. But if the opponent of bestiality were to adopt such an explanation, then he would have simply jumped out of the frying pan and into the fire. For that explanation would clearly apply to bestiality too. In fact, for reasons already stated, bestiality is less problematic than killing for food—less even in many of the immoral cases (see Case 2), but way less when conducted in a manner that respects animal wellbeing and (by a mutual exchange of benefits) that do not involve treating animals as mere means. It is certainly less problematic than slaughter of the factory-farmed variety. It avoids, as least in the benign cases, the torture and death of the animal and respects the sentience and the dignity of the animal, exposing it neither to strain nor humiliation. Perhaps it might also be relevant to add that it comes neither with the hefty environmental impacts (deforestation, greenhouse gas emissions, water pollution) nor the health concerns of eating animal flesh (heart disease, diabetes, and cancers).[xvii]
(6) So many of us endorse the following triad: (a) animals can never consent; (b) animal consent need not be obtained in order for nonsexual engagement with humans to be permissible; (c) animal consent must be obtained in order for sexual engagement with humans to be permissible. One problem with holding these three positions is that it renders impermissible many of the sexual practices involved in animal husbandry: masturbating animals, fingering their anuses, playing with their testicles, tying their penises closed to prevent ejaculate from leaking, inseminating them, and so on. If one insists that such human assistance should not count as sexual activity (which sounds quite ridiculous), then the bigger problem—namely, the seeming impossibility of reconciling claim-b and claim-c (that is, the seeming impossibility of laying out an ethical principle according to which animal-consent matters when it comes to sexual interactions but does not matter when it comes to nonsexual interactions)—only becomes more difficult to address. What ethically-relevant justification could there ever be, after all, for saying that, whereas lack of consent renders masturbating a pig for sexual purposes immoral, lack of consent does not render masturbating a pig for nonsexual purposes immoral? Yes, it might be (say, for human-wellbeing issues I discuss in the next section) that masturbating a pig for sexual purposes is immoral whereas doing so for nonsexual reasons is not. But that is not the point here. The point is how mere lack of consent can render the former action immoral while not rendering the latter action immoral.
(7) Doing something to someone without their consent does not automatically render that something immoral anyway, so it might be relevant to remember. We kiss our babies—yes, even though they might grow up to hate us and hate that we kissed them. We put antibiotics in our fish tanks. We put our dogs on leashes. We hold a door open for someone behind us. We greet people with a hug or handshake without asking first. We take photographs of horses even when they keep turning away from our electro gaze. We trim the cat’s claws so it will not scratch the furniture and clip the bird’s wings so it will not fly away from its captivity. We organize surprise birthday parties. We give someone advice without their asking. We make small talk with people in an elevator. We choose the educational paths and schools of our children. We send our dogs to training schools and board them in kennels and lock them in bedrooms when guests are over even if they resist. We have children despite their having no say in the matter and even though they have a future of radically advanced socio-cognitive awareness in which there is—whether because of the mental and physical suffering inherent to life, or because of concerns with overpopulation and resource depletion and environmental cataclysm, or because of angst about life having no ultimate point anyway—a decent likelihood (especially in our doom-and-gloom epoch of rapidly-growing antinatalism) that they will prefer never to have been born. What, then, is wrong with the girl in Case 4, slated to die after a short life into which she was thrown, getting off in her own private world on the back of the horse without its consent?
Third, and tied up with the issue of consent, it is said that animals do not understand the implications of sexual acts. But to use this as grounds to say ultimately that bestiality is morally impermissible is suspect.
(1) Let us be careful about crowding the diversity of animals into one monolithic cage, as if what goes for an insect on this matter goes for creatures like dolphins (who use baby talk around their children to whom they even transmit cultural practices like tool use). Higher-order mammals make informed choices and know the implications of their sexual activity, as is made clear after a few minutes on TikTok watching bonobos and dolphins masturbating and fornicating in the cleverest ways. Case 8 is a perfect example. Both the dolphin and the swimmer understand that each intends to use the other as a means to their own ends—although not, even though the dolphin is persistent to the point of aggression, as a mere means (so let us assume). Both aware of the implications of the sexual activity, they enter a sort of mutual agreement where one another’s autonomy is respected, which in many cases is not something we can say of our supposedly “innocuous” sex-based interactions with animals: castrating them, inseminating them (again and again in the case of cows in order to ensure a steady flow of supermarket milk), fondling them to be more receptive to semen, tying them to breeding racks, roping up their penises so none of their ejaculate will leak, and so on. And even if I admit against my better judgment that smarter mammals like horses and dolphins and bonobos do not know the implications to the requisite degree (whatever that might be), then it would seem to follow (all other things being equal) that it is immoral for dolphins to grind sexually on other dolphins (or many of the other creatures they grind upon). Surely that is going too far.
(2) For animals where it is less obvious that they understand the implications, what matter really is that fact so long as their welfare is being honored in the various ways I discussed? Surely it is not morally impermissible for them to have sex with their own kind even if they lack the mental firepower to tease out the implications. So all other safeguards in place (which is more than these animals can expect in sexual relations with most other animals), what relevance does their not knowing the implications have when involved in sex with humans? What matter is it, for example, if the tween girl in Case 4 gets off from the horse gyrations? The horse is no more the wiser than the sofa arm on which the girl also grinds. Aside from the small difference in intent and the rider’s added pleasure, what morally relevant difference is there from just simply riding the horse but not getting off? The horse’s autonomy and welfare and status as a morally worthy entity is being respected either way.
(3) A turtle has no idea what is happening when we take its picture. And yet it is, presumably, morally okay for us to do so. If it is morally okay to take its picture even though it lacks a relevantly-robust understanding of the picture-taking practice (which it has no power to want, or to allow, or to resist), then the turtle’s not knowing the implication of the man’s ejaculating on its shell in Case 6 does not render the action impermissible.
(4) If you insist that an animal’s not knowing the implication of sexual activity with a human renders that activity impermissible, then you better not hold that it is morally okay to take pictures of horses and dogs or castrate them. After all, horses and dogs could be said to understand the implications of neutering and picture taking (practices that are a relatively new human design) even less than the implications of fornicating (a practice, common to human and beast alike, more ancient than the nervous system).
Fourth, and also tied up with the issue of consent, it is said that animals have less power than humans. But to use this as grounds to say ultimately that bestiality is morally impermissible is suspect.
(1) The animals involved in bestiality need not be domesticated or dependent on humans. Male chimpanzees have been known to attempt to mount human females. Male dolphins and walruses and sea lions have been known to attempt to mount human swimmers.
(2) It does not seem to matter even if the animals are dependent on humans for food and shelter. Many human housewives were in a similar position in the last century, and yet their sexual relations with their husbands are not generally seen as morally problematic.
(3) Many of the animals we geld and mate and ride and cage and slaughter are dependent on humans for their livelihoods too, and yet these activities—at least some of them—are considered morally unproblematic. Whereas grinding out a clitoral orgasm on the back of the horse means nothing traumatic to the horse, and whereas letting the dog lick your vagina means—unlike with heady humans in their symbolic worlds—nothing traumatic to the dog (and, in fact, can be as fun and bonding as playing fetch), their castration does mean something traumatic to them. It is a heavy event. Their castration involves taking advantage of their inability to resist. For the sake of the argument at least, I might even go so far as to say that the person who beholds another cut off the testicles of a horse has an inner sense (echoed perhaps in the fact that genital mutilation is considered an abhorrent practice in the case of humans)—an inner sense, a moral conscience, that tells him he is witnessing an action of the highest orders of immorality. On the other hand, I would add that a person beholding a dog lick a woman’s vagina has an inner sense—however drowned out by societal disgust—that tells him this action is permissible (if not blessed).
(4) It need not matter that the human is smarter and more cognitively equipped. So long as the animal is consenting in its own way and is free to dissent (as opposed, say, to being held in place), then the disparity in intellectual ability is irrelevant (as it is in the case of a genius human having sex with a regular human from the block).
(5) As for physicality rather than intelligence, there need not be a human-leaning imbalance in power (see Cases 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12). The horse in Case 11, for example, has much more physical power than the man slurping at her vulva and can move away at any time.
(6) Whether there is a physical imbalance does not seem to matter anyway. Power imbalances exist in various unproblematic relationships. What matters is whether no coercion is happening and whether all consenting partners are free to dissent at any time. We do not find a problem with a giant man having sex with a woman with dwarfism who—lacking legs, to boot—cannot effectively resist if the man does not want her too. The deciding factor is not whether the physically-weaker party can effectively resist the other, but rather whether the physically-stronger party is willing and able to back down if the other wants him to. The same goes in the case of those animal-to-human sexual interactions. The issue is whether the human is willing and able to back down if the animal does not want the sexual activity or, in cases where the animal does not know what is happening (see Cases 4-6), that the human does not hurt the animal or interfere with its interests and goals.
(7) Of course, one might say that the physical imbalance in the case of human-to-human sexual activity is not a problem since there is a social network to protect the physically-weaker party. But just as prostitutes can enjoy more protection when prostitution is decriminalized and destigmatized, animals can enjoy more protections when bestiality is decriminalized and destigmatized. Of course, the turtle cannot call the police if it is being forced into unwilling situations. But this applies to any of our interactions with turtles, even the most uncontroversial ones: petting it, lifting it, cleaning it. The best we can do, then, is let the animal speak on its own terms. If it does not want to be under the heat lamp, it will move. To demand that it would have to be able to contact the police in some way in order for sexual interaction with it to be permissible would be an unreasonably high standard, a standard rendering even its interaction with other turtles impermissible.
Fifth, it is said that we can never be sure that the animal is fully willing to engage in sexual activities with a human. But to use this as grounds to say ultimately that bestiality is morally impermissible is suspect.
(1) By extrapolating from our own wants and interests and behaviors, we can understand the wants and interests and behaviors of animals (higher-order mammals, in particular). We can empathize with the hummingbird’s elaborate dance in front of a female: we ourselves engage in such courtship rituals—using elaborate displays (vibrant clothing, shiny accessories, confident body language, dance moves) as well as being persistent in our courting attempts (thereby showcasing both our discipline and the sincerity of our desire). We can empathize with the moose mother who chases down, despite the danger, the bear that attacked her child: we ourselves are possessed of this drive to protect our loved ones. We can empathize with wolves hunting in packs, and ants working together to build complex colonies, and orcas coordinating their efforts to catch prey: we ourselves reap the benefits of working together toward shared objectives. We can empathize with lion cubs chasing one another and wrestling as their parents laze about in the shade: we ourselves were largely the same way as children and are now largely the same way as adults, envious of the boundless energy of the young. We can empathize with dolphin mothers passing down to their offspring the tradition of using sea sponges to protect their snouts while foraging on the sea floor: we ourselves transmit so many techniques to our young, as in when we teach them to use chopsticks to pickup food or to identify poisonous snakes or so on. Our empathetic grasp of what is going on with animals is especially true when it comes to our pets. In such bonded proximity, animal and human start becoming more like one another, enough perhaps even to blur species boundaries (if only metaphorically). We start to become more like our dogs, for example: becoming more attuned to certain smells and sounds and nonverbal cues; empathizing, in general, with the doggy point of view (as in when outdoor spots good for taking a pee start standing out to us). Our dogs, on the other hand, start to become more like us: learning the meanings of words; increasing their problem-solving skills and cognitive abilities to much greater levels than their wild counterparts; eating human foods on a human schedule; vocalizing to music and humming and singing like their owners. Since we can largely understand the wants and needs of animals, we surely can in regards to sex—sex being, unlike computer programming or poetry writing, a practice (along with eating and sleeping) in which we become virtually one with animals.
(2) It might be said that we can never be sure the animal is fully willing to engage in sexual activities because, as we know with humans (especially in the case of rape), body language is one thing and wanting to go through with a sexual act is another. But that gap is not so extreme in the case of animals. Unlike a human who might put on a smile façade but really be angry inside, it is extremely unlikely that a dog is not truly feeling affection toward you despite overwhelming you with affection signals: nuzzling, licking, jumping on you with tail-wagging excitement, exposing its underbelly for reciprocal rubs, and so forth. The same goes when it comes to sexual behavior. However much a person who has sex with animals is revolting embarrassment to humankind, much more of a revolting embarrassment is the person who says, on the one hand, “We can never know if animals really want to engage in sex,” and yet who says, on the other hand, (in light of the kisses and cuddles) “My dog loves when I take him to the park!” or (in light of the torn up shoes and scratches at the door) “My dog hates when I leave for work.” The gap, by any ordinary measure, completely closes in cases when the unconditioned animal is the aggressor of the sexual activity the whole way through (see Cases 7-9). And even in cases where the human is the initiator, priority can be given to the animal steering the interaction. That would be a reasonable gauge as to whether the animal really is down. Case 10 is a good example. The man does not restrict the dog from stopping the fellatio and yet the dog stays put, wiggling to heighten the experience. This is unlike the case described, and approvingly so, by Temple Grandin, where the farm boars—although fondled in ways sensitive to their individual turn-ons—presumably cannot evade the sexual stimulation or the money-making mounting it is meant to incite.
Each boar had his own little perversion the [farmer] had to do to get the boar turned on so he could collect the semen. Some of them were just things like the boar wanted to have his dandruff scratched while they were collecting him. . . . The other things the man had to do were a lot more intimate. He might have to hold the boar’s penis in exactly the right way that the boar liked, and he had to masturbate some of them in exactly the right way. There was one boar, he told me, who wanted to have his butt hole played with. ‘I have to stick my finger in his butt, he just really loves that,’ he told me. . . . [H]e’s one of the best in the business.[xviii]
(3) If my opponent insists, in spite of all this, that we can never be sure the animal is fully willing to engage in sexual activities even in the case where animals are clearly and effectively consenting (see Case 7-12), then presumably this is because—for what else could be the reason at this point?—we cannot get inside the animal’s head. But the same can be said in the case of consensual-seeming sex with a fellow human. Some firecracker can mount me, but I can never be sure if she is fully willing to engage since I do not have access to her first-person point of view. She might not even be conscious, a philosophical zombie, for all I know. This is, of course, the “problem of other minds.” If the problem of other minds in the former case renders bestiality immoral, then the problem of other minds in the latter case renders run-of-the-mill sexual activities between humans immoral too. Surely this is an unwelcome result.
Sixth, if someone—despite all I have said—remains concerned about sexual interactions between humans and animals even in radically innocuous cases (like Case 4 or Cases 8-11), there is a technical solution—one I think, however, is often excessive and degrading while also practically difficult: the presence of a third-party animal-welfare advocate who, as an ethicist and expert on the communication styles of all parties involved, could ensure that no abuse occurs and that dignity is respected. The third-party referee—not only knowledgeable about the animal’s capabilities and level of interest and signs (especially of distress), but also driven by a vocational desire to ensure animal safety and sexual enjoyment—would keep in mind the context of the sexual interaction to ensure that no coercion or exploitation or cruelty takes place and that the animal is genuinely enjoying the activity. The man in Case 10, for example, can have a dog-welfare advocate present before any fellatio occurs. Any additional measures to safeguard the animal’s welfare can be worked into the example. And if not, then quite frankly the demand is too high. The demand is high enough, I suspect, to come at the price of rendering even heterosexual interactions between married humans, and sexual interactions between animals of the same species, impermissible. That would be going too far, I gather most would agree.
6.3. Conclusion
Engaging in sexual interactions with animals presents ethical concerns that extend beyond consent and into consideration of the animal’s sexual autonomy, bodily integrity, and inherent rights (issues addressed in this section). That said, consent might very well be the major issue to tackle when focusing on the morality of bestiality. After all, if one ever is stupid enough to question the legitimacy of our taboo against bestiality (as I did on that fated playdate), one is most likely going to hear right away—in a tone of how-stupid-can-you-be righteousness (a tone somehow made even more pathetic by its roboticism)—“Animals can’t consent!”
Let me end, then, with an argument that serves to rope together some of the nuances surrounding the issue of bestiality and consent.
1. Either an animal can in some sense consent or an animal cannot in any sense consent.
2. If an animal can in some sense consent, then sexual activity with that animal is morally permissible so long as the human (a) respects the sort of consent they can give, while also (b) making sure—perhaps in part by honoring the principle that the lesser one’s power to consent the more control one should have in the interaction—that the animal is never doing what it does not want to do, that it is not in pain, and that it is not the sort of creature whose powers of consent will advance radically enough for it to be reasonable to wait until that time.
3. If an animal cannot in any sense consent (neither at a different time nor even in the most trivial way of an amoeba’s advancing toward food or retreating from danger), then one need not worry about consent when engaging in sexual activity with the animal any more than one need worry about a candle’s consent when sticking it up our butts, in which case sexual activity with such an animal is morally permissible so long as, of course, the animal is not harmed or disrupted in their goal pursuits (or whatever other conditions are morally relevant here: such as—in case onlooker feelings are morally relevant—that the sexual activity is carried out in private so no one is triggered).
Therefore, sexual activity with animals can be morally permissible (whether or not the animal can give any degree of consent).
Notes
[i] Francione makes this distinction between animal welfare and animal rights, where the former concerns treating animals humanely (however we might use them as our tools) and where the latter concerns respecting the fact that animals are moral agents and so cannot just be used as our tools (2000, xxiii-xxix).
[ii] Beirne 2000, 332; see Otto 2005. The notion that bestiality is animal rape is reflected in the legal codes of certain states. California and Oregon, for example, classify bestiality as sexual assault (See Barwick 2022).
[iii] Belliotti 1993, 232.
[iv] Beirne 2000, 331; Beirne 2009, 116; see Belliotti 1993, 230; Ascione 2008, 77-78.
[v] Baldari n.d.
[vi] Beirne 2000, 326; Beirne 2009.
[vii] MacKinnon 2004, 267; Bolliger and Goetschel 2005, 23, 40.
[viii] See Linzey 2009, 34. Andrea Datz, a horse rehabilitation specialist, puts the point well. “Every horse has the capacity to clearly convey how they feel about what we ask of them. We have the capacity to offer connection with our horses in a way that fosters mutuality. Both horse and human getting our needs met in the partnership. Offering choices, and looking for signs that our horse accepts our offer, giving us consent to proceed with what we have in mind” (2020).
[ix] See Haynes 2014, 129n36.
[x] Hertha James, a horse trainer, summarizes these points well. “It is not hard to recognize horses communicating loudly when they don’t want to do something. . . . The concept of waiting for a horse to give permission or consent for us to carry on with a task may be a novel idea for some people. . . . When it becomes the horse’s idea to initiate their handler’s next action, the horse begins to share ‘ownership’ of the behavior we are working with. Such a feeling of ownership alleviates the anxiety and tension that arise if the horse is constrained and forced to accept what is being done to him” (2008).
[xi] This objection is apparent in Beirne 2000, 326, 331.
[xii] See Levy 2003, 447. Adopting all four conditions would result in me having to say that Case 5, despite what I claimed in section 2, is not a case of permissible bestiality. The calf, after all, is not hormonally mature and so fails the first condition (although not the fourth since the adult cow’s state of awareness is not relevantly different from a calf’s). I am not a fan of the first condition anyway. Imagine someone who, because of some hormone problem, only gets nonsexual erections. If all the other conditions are met in his case (no strong likelihood that later he would take back his assent to the fellatio happening to him, no strong likelihood that he would later feel traumatized by it, and he is largely in his most developed state of awareness), it seems that this person can consent in the fullest extent even if he does not meet the first condition. Since my goal in this paper is simply to argue that some cases of bestiality are morally permissible, however, I am fine with retaining the first condition and thereby with taking back my claim that Case 5 is morally permissible.
[xiii] At this point, one might wonder what I might say about a toddler who is guaranteed to be stuck in its developmental state forever. Well, if the first condition is to be upheld, then sexual activity with the toddler is impermissible (since he has not the hormones for sexual desire). However, if the first condition is to be rejected (and I think it should be), then I do admit that sexual activity with the toddler could be permissible in certain situations. If it were guaranteed that the toddler would be stuck in its state of development forever (and so is already at its full cognitive capacity, unable to be affected by messages from society that repeat “You have been victimized in the worst way”), and if it was also the case that either no one would find out about the activity or the toddler’s caretakers (and perhaps anyone else who might know about the activity) were okay with the activity, then certain sexual scenarios—letting, say, the toddler suck on the adult’s clitoris the way it does the nipple—would be morally permissible as far as I am concerned. Of course, I am assuming here that all the safeguards to the child’s wellbeing are in place, and are so out of a conscious desire to protect the most vulnerable: being careful to inflict no injury, using measures to avoid disease transmission, letting the toddler lead the way. Such safeguards might also include having the blessing, or perhaps even the presence, of a welfare advocate.
[xiv] See Haynes 2014, 125n18, 125n20, 134n67.
[xv] The moral permissibility of Case 11, for example, is especially clear in that it falls perfectly in line with the model of attentive and trustful and consent-based horse interaction that Hertha James lays out. “Horses use distinct body language. . . . ‘Okay Signals’ are initiated by the horse to let us know that they feel okay for us to repeat what we are doing or to carry on with a procedure that involves a variety of things. When I’m walking on the road with Boots, I’ve become aware of her need to stop and assess things such as cows moving in the distance, a vehicle in an unusual place or something that has changed in the environment since we last passed by. If I stop with her and wait, paying attention to what has caught her attention, we are ‘on the same page’. . . . Eventually Boots will lower her head and bring her attention back to me, which tells me that she has satisfied her need to notice and is ready to walk on. This is the most basic ‘okay’ signal for us to watch out for” (2018).
[xvi] See Haynes 2014, 131-132.
[xvii] One might say that riding and castrating and eating them are more important to us than our sexual use of them and that that explains why, on the one hand, lack of animal consent makes it wrong to engage in sexual activity with animals but why, on the other hand, lack of animal consent does not make it wrong to ride animals and castrate them and eat them. But two things should be said. First, we do not need to eat them in a time of the impossible burger. So the importance of sex with them and the eating of them is on a par. In this case, if lack of consent rules out the permissibility of having sex with animals, then it also rules out the permissibility of eating them. (2) Who gets to decide what is most important? Presumably it is the human. But presumably there are humans—vegan humans—who find sex with animals more important than eating them, which undercuts the explanation at hand. Perhaps more importantly, those who do not get to decide what is important are left vulnerable to abuse. Haynes put the point well.
But the argument that our supposedly innocuous uses of animals are more important than any sexual uses of animals is really a nonstarter. To allow the necessity of consent to vary with the aggressor’s perception of a practice’s importance would produce a disrespectful, self-centered culture in which the dignitary interests of society’s weakest members are routinely undervalued. Precisely because we perceive some practices as more important, the potential for abuse and ignoring the relevance of consent is at its apex” (2014, 130n44).
[xviii] Grandin and Johnson 2005, 103.
