Section 4 of "A Defense of Bestiality"
Let’s workshop--for National Interspecies-Sex Month--the fourth section of an essay defending the moral permissibility of bestiality under certain circumstances
Sections 1 and 2 can be found here.
Section 3 can be found here.
A Defense of Bestiality
Dedicated to Gary Varner
4. Biblical Case Against Bestiality
4.1. Argument
Turning away from our gut and moving instead to the Bible, many think, can settle the debate. The Bible, after all, is revered as the inerrant word of God and—unlike, say, the earlier Hittite codes, which criminalize sexual relations with pig and dog (a death-penalty offense) but not at all with mule and horse—the biblical codes condemn bestiality across the board.[i] Since the God in question here is defined as perfect in goodness and knowledge, whatever he says is wrong must be wrong (regardless as to whether it aligns with our personal judgments).
Here are the key anti-bestiality passages from the Old Testament.
Whoever has intercourse with an animal shall be put to death. (Exodus 22:19)
You shall not have sexual relations with any animal and defile yourself with it, nor shall any woman give herself to an animal to have sexual relations with it; it is perversion. (Leviticus 18:23)
If a man has sexual relations with an animal, he shall be put to death, and you shall kill the animal. If a woman approaches any animal and has sexual relations with it, you shall kill the woman and the animal; they shall be put to death; their bloodguilt is upon them. (Leviticus 20:15-16)
Cursed be anyone who lies with any animal. (Deuteronomy 27:21)
The New Testament too—although never getting too specific—condemns “sexual immorality” (porneia) altogether, which would include bestiality along with adultery, incest, rape, prostitution, anal sex, and so on (1 Corinthians 6:18; Mark 7:21-23).
Why is bestiality targeted so incessantly as an abomination? Why does it stand as such a deep transgression that, to add “injury to insult,” even animals raped in the process are due the death penalty?[ii] Well, putting aside the fact that non-reproductive sex conflicted with the desperate desire of the Jewish tribe—small and persecuted—to secure its numbers,[iii] and putting aside the fact that many of the pagan practices from which the ancient Jews sought to separate themselves involved bestiality,[iv] the theological answer lies in the contradiction bestiality poses to the special dignity and rationality that God gifted to humans alone. Superior as created in the image of God (Genesis 1:27), humans—knowing right from wrong—have the power to resist the lustful drives, the base urges, that have mastery over the beasts. Engaging in bestiality, then, is the most slanderous way to reject the divine spark inside each human.[v] Yes, other activities as well—ranging, so at least some religious pamphlets say, from drunkenness and profanation to adultery and incest—amount to declaring “I am mere beast!”[vi] But the starkest way to deny that God put you above pigs and dogs is to have sex with pigs and dogs—particularly anal sex, which at times was considered a sin too wicked to be named (even when “merely” between two consenting men).[vii] That is the idea anyway.
We can summarize these considerations in the following argument.
1. If the Bible says that bestiality is morally impermissible, then bestiality is morally impermissible.
2. The Bible says that bestiality is morally impermissible.
Therefore, bestiality is morally impermissible.
4.2 Response
The obvious target to attack is the first premise, the assumption that the Bible provides authoritative moral guidance on the matter of bestiality. Here are the central problems it faces.
(1) Numerous holy texts make claims concerning what practices are moral and immoral. These claims often enough contradict one another. It seems futile, therefore, to declare a particular ethical standpoint wrong based solely on the decrees of a holy book. In the crucible of the philosophy classroom, people debate using public reason (as opposed to brute force or emotional manipulation or claims of divine insight or so on). We need to turn to a more objective and universally-compelling justification for the immorality of bestiality, in that case—a reason that ideally would resonate with anyone of sound mind. Other than doing that, which I think we really start doing in sections 6 and 7, the person giving the Bible-says-so argument against bestiality faces the burdensome task of showing not only that their holy book rejects bestiality under all circumstances, but also that it is the uncorrupted word of an entity that both exists and is perfect in moral knowledge.
(2) The Bible considers homosexuality death-worthy immoral.[viii] But homosexuality is something I take to be acceptable, as I imagine most people would agree (especially in our era where nonnormative sexual orientation is considered not only a respect-deserving aspect of an individual’s identity, but also grounds for special dispensations). Such a stark discrepancy indicates that the Bible’s stance against bestiality is insufficient to demonstrate its impermissibility—unless definitive proof can be shown that the God of this Bible exists and really is all perfect (which would entail that whatever he says must be correct, however much we do not like it). Since we cannot trust the fact that homosexuality is wrong just because the Bible says so (at least until such proof is given), we cannot trust the fact that bestiality is morally impermissible just because the Bible says so.
(3) It might very well be either (a) that the Bible does not reject homosexuality altogether—only certain forms, like pederasty, popular among the pagans (ancient Mesopotamians, ancient Egyptians, ancient Greeks, and ancient Persians) from which the ancient Israelites seemed desperate to distance themselves—or (b) that, even if the Bible does reject homosexuality altogether (which is the interpretation I lean toward), it is fair game to adjust the proscription to our new times (as we have done with eating pork now that we enjoy the benefits of refrigeration). But not only does either option invite further problems for the Bible-says-so argument (opening the door for me, in effect, to pull the same two spin moves in the case of bestiality),[ix] the bigger issue is that the Bible, contrary to the background presumption of the argument, seems full of indications of its moral errancy. Homosexuality aside, the Bible considers morally impermissible many things that pretty much all of us consider morally permissible: having anal sex (Leviticus 18:22; Romans 1:26-27),[x] eating lobsters and snails (Leviticus 11:9-12), getting tattoos (Leviticus 19:28), wearing linen-wool blends of fabrics (Leviticus 19:19), playing with pigskin footballs (Deuteronomy 14:8), werking the runway as a drag-queen (Deuteronomy 22:5), consulting psychics (Leviticus 19:31), engaging in usury (Leviticus 25:36 and Exodus 22:25), initiating a divorce for any reason aside from infidelity (Matthew 19:9), failing to obey one’s slave master like one obeys God himself (Ephesians 6:5-8; Colossians 3:22-25), getting a fade at a black barbershop (Leviticus 19:27). Since we cannot trust the fact that anal sex (and the other actions from this quirky list) are wrong just because the Bible says so (at least until proof is given that the God of this Bible exists and really is all perfect), we cannot trust the fact that bestiality is morally impermissible just because the Bible says so.
4.3. Conclusion
Merely citing biblical passages, even when those passages are revered by billions, seems insufficient to establish the moral impermissibility of bestiality. More rationally-compelling justifications are needed, right? Consider again the point I raised at the end of section 3. Presumably kicking infants in the head for the fun of it is wrong, if it really is wrong, not at root because God says so. Instead of being, in effect, the arbitrary decree of God, the direction of explanation goes the other way around: God says kicking infants in the head for fun is wrong because doing so is wrong, wrong according to facts independent of whatever God says—facts that seem to have a direct bearing on the issue. The opponent of bestiality, therefore, needs to disclose what these facts are in the case of bestiality.
* * *
It is tempting for me to leave the discussion with that reasonable remark. Out of transparency, however, I should note that the assumption behind that remark—namely, that right and wrong is not a function of God’s arbitrary say so—is, although endorsed by the majority of philosophers throughout history (including Plato and Leibniz), more controversial than nonspecialists might realize. There are grounds to debate whether right and wrong is a function of the arbitrary decision of God. An advocate of this view (a form of ethical relativism known as “divine command theory”) would remind us—and here I am summoning the voluntaristic reasoning of Hobbes and Pufendorf—that the God in question is the everything-maker, limitless in what he is able to do and what he has jurisdiction over. But if right and wrong are ultimately a function of facts independent of God’s say so (facts such as that it causes unnecessary suffering, for example), then that would imply that God does not have jurisdiction over the standard of right and wrong. Perhaps even stranger than saying that God—the almighty—does not have jurisdiction over something, God himself would be judgeable by this independent standard. But that does not mesh with the idea of God as the supreme authority, perfect in power.
If it is true that (a) right and wrong is purely a function of God’s arbitrary decision (such that it would not be wrong to kick an infant in the head if God decided it was not wrong), then my thesis would be dead in the water if, in addition, it were also true that (b) God exists and (c) God rejects bestiality wholesale. Leaving claim-b alone (both because it might take us too far afield into metaphysical matters and because I accept God’s existence in at least a roughly Spinozistic sense), there are some things I can say in response to these other claims.
(1) Despite my strong inclination, I cannot attack claim-c simply by saying that—in light of the cases of seemingly unproblematic bestiality (like Case 4 or Case 7)—a supreme being perfect in moral knowledge (like God is supposed to be) would never reject bestiality wholesale. Such an attack would not be efficacious, after all, if claim-a and claim-b are true. For if whether bestiality is moral or not is just a matter of the random decision, the groundless whim, of an existing God, then my reasons matter no more than my pleas to him for forgiveness if he has already made up his mind for good that I would be damned. That all said, I can turn this admission around in my favor by raising an epistemic problem for claim-c. Even if we assume—which we must in order not to violate claim-a—that right and wrong is ultimately an arbitrary matter of God’s say so, what is the method for figuring out what God’s commands actually are? How is one to know whether God really does reject bestiality? One might try to rest one’s case on the Bible’s remarks against bestiality, but why believe that the Bible reflects God’s word—why, especially in light of its quirky proscriptions and the various other holy texts with different views? If one rests one’s case on more compelling grounds (such as that bestiality violates animal wellbeing or whatever), then to make that move mesh with the spirit of claim-a one would have to show that the grounds cited clue us in somehow to what God has arbitrarily decided—a difficult task since one cannot resort (without violating claim-a) to the instinctual move of saying that God’s decision was because of those grounds. Here is my stab at a solution on behalf of divine command theory. Perhaps God constructed us in a certain way that we would be, say, upset by violations of, say, animal wellbeing and that such hurt would point us, like a compass pointing north, to what he decided ultimately for no reason whatsoever: namely, that bestiality is wrong. But if that is how the response is going to work (and that does seem the best strategy to get out of the epistemic problem I have raised), then we can move on, like I said at the beginning of this conclusion, to looking at other grounds for rejecting bestiality.
(2) On top of reminding the reader of the repugnance of saying that whether raping babies in torturous fashion for the pure fun of it is ultimately an arbitrary decision of God (such that raping babies for fun would be morally kosher if God said it was), I might raise doubts about the rationale given for claim-a, a rationale that boils down to this: saying that right and wrong is a function of facts independent of God’s say so violates God’s being the omnipotent maker of all. How might one get around such a compelling line of reasoning? Well, most theologians agree that God’s inability to do certain things need not impugn his omnipotence. For the things he is unable to do—make the number three divisible by two without remainder, or make the top of the mercury in a thermometer be two inches from the bottom at the same time and in the same respect as it is merely one inch from the bottom—are, being logically impossible, not even “on the table,” so to say, as candidate things to be done. Why is saying this relevant? Well, a case can be made for the claim that ethical truths, such as that it is impermissible to kick an infant in the head for the pure fun of it, are necessary—necessary in the sense of being true in all possible worlds. The ethical statement in question is necessary, we might say, in virtue of being implied by a principle that is self-evident—a principle, in other words, that is necessarily true since it provides the rationale for its own truth; a principle perhaps whose predicate is already contained in its subject. A good candidate for such a principle here is the so-called “principle of mercy,” which says that unnecessary suffering is wrong. So just as God’s inability to kill himself or make two plus two equal five or change the nature of circularity does not impugn his omnipotence, neither does his inability to change ethical truths. Of course, the issue remains that God does not seem to be the everything-maker on this view. But what is stopping us from saying, as Leibniz does, that all necessary truths belong to the essence of God?[xi] It seems nothing (especially if God is conceived as the very isness of everything that is, rather than some superbeing in the sky).[xii] Since God creates himself (not by some choice but rather simply by having existence baked into his very nature), God can be said to create these too—yes, even as what they are is no more changeable than that he is.[xiii]
In light of the fact that the wrongness of raping an infant in drawn-out torture for the pure fun of it (if it really is wrong) does not seem to be ultimately an arbitrary matter (as it would be according to claim-a), and in light of the grounds for reconciling God’s being the all-powerful everything maker with right and wrong not being a function of God’s arbitrary say so (despite the rationale given for claim-a), and in light of the epistemic problem of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate commands of God (such that there is room to doubt the truth of claim-c without compromising claim-a), I think it is safe to move on from the God angle against bestiality.
Notes
[i] See Holoyda 2022; Masters 1966 One explanation for why horse and mule are okay is that they can be corralled and so, unlike with dogs and pigs, kept clean.
[ii] Dawkins 2006, 248. In response to Dawkin’s disgust (which I share) that the animals alongside their human rapists are to be put to death, biblical scholars explain that it is largely a matter of pragmatics to put the animal down. The idea is that it would be morally and even physically dangerous to have animals walking among humans tempting them just by being there or even, having developed twisted fetishes like we see sometimes in the case of human rape victims, trying to grind upon humans. Clay Jones, a Christian apologist at Biola, puts the point nicely when discussing why God orders the ancient Israelites to kill every single one of the animals in Canaan, a bestiality hotspot (see Deuteronomy 13:15; 20:16). “Consider how disgusting it would be to have dogs, sheep, and who knows what trying to mount the unsuspecting, not to mention how disgusting and dangerous it would be to have horses, oxen, and great apes trying to do so! . . . Animals that are used to having sex with humans [(as many were in Canaan)] have to die just like animals used to killing humans have to die. It’s not that the animals deserved to die. They didn’t deserve to die because they hadn’t done anything wrong. But only the depraved would want to live around sexualized animals so they had to go. Now the objection could be made that some of the animals may not have been subject to such abuse, but that’s not something that an Israelite would be able to know. Thus they all had to die. Major takeaway: sometimes beings innocent of committing sin can be harmed and corrupted by others who misuse their free will, as seems to be the case with animals involved in bestiality. It is a tragedy that these animals had to be killed but that’s one of the big lessons about sin: Sinful beings can hurt the innocent sometimes permanently” (Jones 2015).
[iii] Beetz 2004, 5; Masters 1966.
[iv] Carr 2016, 423; Holoyda 2022; Miletski 2005; Masters 1966.
[v] No wonder, then, that when indicted for sex with a female dog in 1595, George Dawson was said neither to have “God before his eyes” nor to respect “the dignity of human nature” (Thomas 2011, 159).
[vi] Thomas 2011, 152.
[vii] Thomas 2011, 158.
[viii] In the Old Testament, in addition to passages like Genesis 9:20–27 and Genesis 19:1–11, we get “If a man has sexual relations with a man as one does with a woman, both of them have done what is detestable. They are to be put to death” (Leviticus 20:13). And in the New Testament, on top of passages like 1 Corinthians 6:9–10 and Romans 1:26–27, we get homosexuality described as “sexually immoral” and “contrary to the sound doctrine” (1 Timothy 1:10).
[ix] Let me explain in case it is not obvious. If claim-a is true, then that opens the door to arguing that the biblical passages against bestiality are not condemning bestiality wholesale—a rejection of premise 2, in effect. After all, just as the Bible never specifically forbids two neurotypical adult men engaging in dry humping with one another (something that those who hold that the Bible does not condemn homosexuality wholesale might say), the Bible never specifically forbids a bonobo and a woman engaging in cruelty-free and mutually-enjoyable cunnilingus with one another (something that a person who holds that the Bible does not condemn bestiality wholesale might say). If, on the other hand, claim-b is true, then it seems fair game to adjust the biblical proscription against bestiality to the new times. After all, just as homosexuality was deemed immoral for a reason that no longer applies (namely, that the ancient Israelites were desperate to keep their numbers against the incessant barrage of oppressive forces), bestiality was deemed immoral for a reason that no longer apples (namely, the same reason against homosexuality, the same reason why the God of the Hebrew Bible, in fact, kills people who ejaculate anywhere outside of the vagina of their wives) (see Masters 1966). In this case, just as a group of men performing bukkake on a consenting man no longer violates God’s command, presumably a man shooting a load on the back of turtle (as in Case 6) no longer violates God’s command.
[x] Romans 1:26-27, if not simply condemning homosexuality altogether, at least condemns anal sex. The first sentence, although traditionally taken as a clear rejection of any form of lesbian sex, simply reads: “For this cause God gave them up unto vile affections: for even their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature.” As should be clear, the passage could just be referring to women engaging in anal sex with their husbands. Now, the immediately following sentence does clearly have in mind man-man homosexuality: “And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompence of their error which was meet.” However, if the unnatural behavior of women in the first sentence is merely referring to taking it in the backdoor, then the second sentence might simply be referring to men who engage with other men through the backdoor as well. Whatever the case might be, though, the main point still stands. Anal sex is not immoral in truth, so at least I think it is safe to assume.
[xi] Leibniz 1988, 71.
[xii] For more on this conception of God, see Istvan 2021b.
[xiii] Perhaps this strategy would be something that both Pufendorf and Leibniz would accept, thereby reconciling the disagreement on the issue of theological voluntarism.
