The Universal Nature of a Spinozistic Substance (Journal of Spinoza Studies)
Dr. Istvan's argument for the claim that a realist conception of universals is a key presumption behind Spinoza’s case for substance monism
Check out my article, “The Universal Nature of a Spinozistic Substance.” It was just released at the Journal of Spinoza Studies.
Here is the Abstract and Introduction
The Universal Nature of a Spinozistic Substance
Dr. Michael A. Istvan Jr. (orcid.org/0000-0002-8675-4510)
Abstract.—There is a longstanding alliance between rationalism and realism concerning universals. Spinoza does not disrupt that alliance. The nature of a Spinozistic substance, after all, is a universal. That is what I argue here. My central point is that a realist conception of universals is a key presumption behind Spinoza’s case for substance monism, a view historically recognized as a natural outgrowth of realism’s toleration of strict identity in diversity. After defending my central point (and, in addition, the secondary point that Spinoza is likely cognizant of this presumption), I respond to two concerns. First, I explain how the nature of a Spinozistic substance is a universal even though there can be only one instance of that nature. Second, I explain how Spinoza’s infamous rejection of universals does not contradict the fact that the nature of a substance is a universal.
1. Introductory Remarks
The status of universals in Spinoza’s ontology has been a topic of disagreement over the centuries. Considering Spinoza’s characterization of universals as abstract figments of the imagination (see TIE 19.3/G II 10 lines 16-19, TIE 76/G II 29 lines 5-15, TIE 93/G II 34 lines 15-22, and TIE 99-100/G II 36 lines 6-29; KV 1.6/G I 43 lines 7-8, KV 1.10/G I 50, KV 2.16.3a/G I 81 lines 18-19, and KV 2.16.4/G I 82 line 5ff; CM 1.1/G I 235 lines 10-30; CM 2.7/G I 263 lines 5-9; E1app, E2p40s1, E2p49s/G II 135 lines 22-23, E4pref/G II 207, and E4p62s/G II 257 line 28; Ep. 2/G IV 19 lines 10-20), some commentators have held that Spinoza is an antirealist concerning universals.[1] On the other hand, and considering Spinoza’s many statements about how distinct things can be strictly identical in some respect (as in when he says that one and the same essence is equally in each individual with that essence, such that each would be destroyed were the essence of just one destroyed: see E1p17s/G II 63 lines 18-24 as well as E2p37-E2p39d, E1p5d, E1p8s2/G II 51 lines 13-14, and E2p10s; TTP 4.6; TP 11.2; Ep. 34), other commentators have held that Spinoza is a realist.[2]
A few commentators, in light of such textual and scholarly tensions, conclude that Spinoza contradicts himself when it comes to the status of universals.[3] My position, as I argue in this paper, is that Spinoza does not contradict himself: Spinoza is a consistent realist concerning universals. Unlike more typical approaches, which center around whether Spinoza allows for universal species essences in the realm of dependent entities, I restrict my focus to the foundational level of Spinoza’s ontology. That is, I focus on a substance in its absolute nature (the attribute level) rather than a substance in its nonabsolute nature (the mode level)—for the most part leaving aside discussion of intra-attribute universality, something I explore elsewhere.
My paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I define key terms (“universal” and “nonuniversal,” “realism” and “antirealism”) and then lay out what background assumptions about Spinoza’s metaphysics underpin my argument (the major one being that Spinozistic attributes are ontologically authentic). In section 3, I argue that the attributes of a Spinozistic substance are universals. A Spinozistic attribute, to summarize the argument, cannot be a nonuniversal because nonuniversal attributes do not conform to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles—a principle to which Spinoza without question believes attributes do conform. Although my central point in section 3 is to show, in effect, that a realist conception of universals is a key presumption behind Spinoza’s case for substance monism, I lay out reasons to think as well that Spinoza is likely cognizant of this presumption. In section 4, I respond to what seems a crucial concern: how an attribute can be a universal given the impossibility in Spinoza’s ontology of an attribute having more than one instantiation. A Spinozistic attribute, despite being necessarily unique, is still a universal, so I explain, since it is the sort of thing that would be one and the same in each substance said to have an exactly similar attribute. Although my central point in section 4 is to show, in effect, that the objection rests on a metaphysically and historically mistaken view about universals, I lay out reasons to think as well that Spinoza is likely cognizant of the fact that the impossibility of an attribute’s multiple instantiation does not render an attribute a nonuniversal. In section 5, I respond to what seems another crucial concern: how an attribute can be a universal given Spinoza’s pejorative remarks against universals. Spinoza’s pejorative remarks, so I explain, target those bogus universals apprehendable merely through the imagination, not those real universals—like the attributes of Extension and Thought—apprehendable through the intellect. Although my central point in section 5 is to show, in effect, that there is no inconsistency between Spinoza’s rejection of universals and the fact that Spinozistic attributes are universals, I lay out reasons to think as well that Spinoza likely makes a conscious effort to preempt the charge of inconsistency.
Notes
[1] For a thorough list of commentators who have held that Spinoza is an antirealist, see Michael A. Istvan Jr., Spinoza and the Problem of Universals: A Study and Research Guide (Diss. Texas A&M University, 2015), ch.1.2 and esp. Appendix D. Here is a clear expression of the interpretation that, in Pollock’s more dramatic words, Spinoza is “the downright enemy of [. . .] universals” (Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (New York: American Scholar Publications, 1966), 141):
[According to Spinoza’s] non-realist construal of “agreement,” to say that certain particulars “agree in nature” is just to say that they resemble one another [(rather than that they are identical in some respect) . . .]. [I]t is this non-realist construal of “agreement” as a cognized similarity that puts us on the right track in interpreting Spinoza’s metaphysics. (Karolina Hübner, “Spinoza on Essences, Universals and Beings of Reason,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97, no. 1 (2016): section 3.2)
[2] For a thorough list of commentators who have held that Spinoza is a realist, see Istvan, Spinoza and the Problem of Universals, ch. 1.2 and esp. Appendix D. Here is a clear expression of the interpretation that, in Fullerton’s more dramatic words, Spinoza was “at heart as thorough a realist as any philosopher of the Middle Ages [. . .]. [H]e thought like a realist, he felt like a realist, he wrote like a realist” (George Fullerton, The Philosophy of Spinoza (New York: H. Holt, 1894), 220; George Fullerton, On Spinozistic Immortality (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1899), 33):
[If Spinoza were a nominalist, then each mode] might bear similarities to, but it could have nothing in common with, other modes. There could be no one nature in many things [. . .]. Nominalism, in short, would be the reductio ad absurdum of his philosophy. (Francis Haserot, “Spinoza and the Status of Universals,” Philosophical Review 59, no. 4 (1950): 469–492)
[3] For a thorough list of commentators who have held that Spinoza is inconsistent on the status of universals, see Istvan, Spinoza and the Problem of Universals, ch. 1.2 and esp. Appendix D. Here is a clear expression of the interpretation that, in Martineau’s more dramatic words, “Spinoza unconsciously retains the realism which he professes to renounce” (James Martineau, A Study of Spinoza (London: Macmillan, 1882), 150n2):
[For an antirealist like Spinoza] modes cannot share a common property [. . .]. [And yet t]here exist certain properties which are identical in all finite modes. Such an admission appears to put Spinoza’s purported stance against the objective reality of universals in serious jeopardy (Edward Schoen, “The Role of Common Notions in Spinoza’s Ethics,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 15, no. 4 (1977): 539–546)
Acknowledgements
This paper is dedicated to M. A. Istvan Sr. and M. A. Istvan III. My project has benefitted from interactions with Aaliyah Fritz, Michael LeBuffe, Kristin Primus, Andrea Sangiacomo, Michael Della Rocca, Charlie Huenemann, José Bermúdez, Stephen Daniel, Britt Mize, Samuel Newlands, Pierre-François Moreau, Justin Lake, Alesha Brereton, Paul Bagley, Steve Barbone, Thomas Cook, Herman De Dijn, Aaron Garrett, Martin Lin, Stefano Di Bella, Gwen Marshall, Warren Montag, Steven Nadler, Don Garrett, Valtteri Viljanen, Amber Carlson, Hugh McCann, Andrew Youpa, and two reviewers at the Journal of Spinoza Studies. RIP to Dave “Plug Two” Jolicoeur from De La Soul and Timothy “Kid Nice” Howard.
Citation info: “The Universal Nature of a Spinozistic Substance.” Journal of Spinoza Studies 2.1 (2023). 15-39.
