The Sufficiency of Spinozistic Attributes for their Finite Modes
Check out this paper, originally published in Síntesis, that argues that finite modes--despite some textual evidence to the contrary--are ultimately entailed by the absolute nature of their attribute
The Sufficiency of Spinozistic Attributes for their Finite Modes
See the full paper here.
Abstract.—Some passages throughout Spinoza’s body of works suggest that an attribute in its absolute nature provides a sufficient condition for all of its modes, including the finite ones. Other passages suggest that an attribute in its absolute nature fails to provide a sufficient condition for its finite modes. My aim is to dispel this apparent tension. I argue that all finite modes are ultimately entailed by the absolute nature of their attribute. Furthermore, I explain how the Spinozistic positions that appear incompatible with this view are in fact compatible. As I see it, we should read those passages where Spinoza says that no finite mode ultimately follows from the absolute nature of its attribute as saying merely that no finite mode ultimately follows in one-by-one fashion, independent of an infinite series of other modes, from the absolute nature of its attribute.
Section 1. Introductory Remarks
There are strong reasons to believe that, for Spinoza, no finite mode is ultimately entailed by the absolute nature of its attribute. In other words, and as several commentators have argued,[1] there are strong reasons to think that an attribute, considered in its absolute nature (that is, as ontologically prior to its modes: see 1p5d), is not sufficient for its finite modes (see 1p21-23, 1p28, 1p28d, 2p30d, 4p4d; KV 1.2 I/34).[2] On the other hand, and as several commentators have also argued,[3] there are strong reasons to believe that an attribute, considered in its absolute nature, does in fact provide a sufficient condition for all of its modes (including the finite ones) (see 1p17s, 1p25s, 1p29, 1app II/77; KV 1.3.2, KV 1.4.8; KV 1.6.3 I/41/23, CM 1.3 I/243; Ep. 12, Ep. 21, Ep. 43, Ep. 81, Ep. 83). My aim in this paper is to dispel this apparent tension, thus attempting to avoid the conclusion, tempting to some commentators,[4] that Spinoza is guilty of contradiction on the matter.
After a few quick points of clarification (Section 2), I make two general moves. First, I argue that the evidence for the view that an attribute in its absolute nature provides a sufficient condition for all of its modes is stronger than the evidence for the view that an attribute in its absolute nature does not provide a sufficient condition for its finite modes (Sections 3 and 4). As I make clear, Spinoza states that an attribute in its absolute nature provides a sufficient condition for all of its modes more frequently than he seems to state that an attribute in its absolute nature does not provide a sufficient condition for its finite modes. Perhaps more importantly, the view that an attribute in its absolute nature does not provide a sufficient condition for its finite modes conflicts with one of the core features of Spinoza’s philosophical vision: thoroughgoing explanatory rationalism. Second, I propose how we might explain away those passages suggesting that finite modes are not ultimately entailed by the absolute nature of their attribute (Section 5). I suggest that we read those passages where Spinoza says that no finite mode ultimately follows from the absolute nature of its attribute as saying something more specific: that no finite mode ultimately follows in one-by-one fashion (as opposed to as part of an infinite series of finite modes) from the absolute nature of its attribute.
Notes
[1] See also Dea 2008, 603-628; Donagan 1973, 241-258; Friedman 1986, 371-401; Fullerton 1894, 254; Miller 2001, 779-814. For helpful background see, especially, Curley 1969, 101-118. For a statement of the difficulty concerning whether Spinozisitic attributes are sufficient for their finite modes, see Curley 1988, 48-50. For a hint of how this issue is tied up with the issue of Spinoza’s necessitarianism, see Curley-Walski, 1999.
[2] All Spinoza citations are from Gebhardt’s Latin critical edition Spinoza Opera and use the following format: abbreviated work title followed by Opera volume number, page number, and line number. The title abbreviations are standard: Letters and Replies (Ep); Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (TdIE); Short Treatise (KV); Metaphysical Thoughts (CM); Theological-Political Treatise (TTP); Political Treatise (TP); Hebrew Grammar (HG); Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy (DPP). So, for example, “DPP 1/263/5” is Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy: volume 1, page 263, line 5 of the Opera. Following standard practice, citations from the Ethics usually refer only to the formal apparatus of the Ethics itself—the first Arabic numeral indicating the part of the book and the following letter abbreviations indicating the type of passage: “a” for axiom; “app” for appendix; “c” for corollary, “d” for definition (when it comes right after the part numeral) or demonstration (for most, but not all, of the other positions); “lem” for lemma; “p” for proposition; “pref” for preface; “s” for scholium; “exp” for explication. Hence “3p59sd4exp” is the explication of the fourth definition of the scholium to the fifty-ninth proposition of Ethics part three. With exception to the occasional modification of my own, translations are from Curley. For Letters 29-84 I refer to Shirley’s translation.
[3] See Carriero 1991; Deleuze 1988, 93-94; Della Rocca 1996, 95-96; Della Rocca 2008, 69-78; Garrett 1999, 103-130; Griffin 2008, 71-93; Hampshire 1970; Huenemann 1999, 224-240; Koistinen 1998, 66; Koistinen 2003, 283-310; Lovejoy 1964, 151-157; Nadler 2006, 84-121; Newlands 2007; Steinberg 1981, 35-68; Viljanen 2008, 412-437.
[4] See Bennett 1984, 111-124; Jarrett 1978, 55-56; Matson 1979, 76-83.
“The Sufficiency of Spinozistic Attributes for their Finite Modes.” Síntesis, Rev filos.. 2021;4(1): 133-155. (doi:10.15691/0718-5448Vol4Iss1a350)
