Spinoza’s Bundle Analysis of Substances Having Attributes
Check out my paper, published in In Circolo, that argues that Spinozistic substances are nothing over and above their attributes (attributes identical merely in that they are necessarily coextensive).
Spinoza’s Bundle Analysis of Substances Having Attributes
See the full paper here.
Abstract.—Considered in its absolute nature, Spinoza’s God is nothing more than the total collection of self-sufficient attributes. God is nothing more than the total collection of self-sufficient attributes in the sense that no attribute is a function of anything ontologically prior to it, and whatever may be in excess to the attributes is entirely a function of the attributes themselves. My bundle interpretation of the substance-attribute relationship in Spinoza’s thought harmonizes, so I argue in this paper, with various Spinozistic positions said to be in tension with it: God’s simplicity and nonderivativeness, the “sameness” of God’s attributes, the unity of parallel modes of different attributes, our being able to know God by knowing just one of his attributes, and so on. Through the help of mapping out how God’s attributes relate to one another in terms of Suárez’s famous taxonomy of distinctions, I explain, moreover, how my interpretation provides solutions to certain famous criticisms of Spinoza’s philosophy, perhaps most importantly Leibniz’s objection to Spinoza’s ontological argument and Tschirnhaus’s puzzlement over Spinoza’s claim that Thought is the same as any other attribute even though it is more replete than any other attribute.
Section 1. Introductory Remarks
1. Introductory remarks
Any thoughtful consideration of Spinoza’s metaphysics demands an understanding of the substance-attribute relationship in his thought. Elsewhere I have argued that Spinoza endorses a constituent analysis of substances having attributes, an interpretation simply according to which the attributes of substances are ontologically authentic or, as it is commonly put, objective. In the paper at hand, which builds on the findings of the previous, I argue that Spinoza endorses specifically a bundle interpretation of substances having attributes, an interpretation according to which a substance is nothing exceeding the sum of its principal attributes. Spinoza’s God, according to this picture, is but the total collection of its attributes in the sense that no attribute is a function of anything ontologically prior to it, and whatever may be in excess to the attributes is entirely a function of the attributes. Since the bundle interpretation is a species of constituent interpretation, this paper incidentally serves as additional evidence for the ontological authenticity of the attributes.
Commentators have raised objections to my interpretation that Spinoza’s God, considered as ontologically prior to its modes, is nothing but the total plurality of its attributes. Aside from the claim that the attributes are not even ontologically authentic to begin with (a claim that I address fully in the aforementioned paper and only incidentally here), the central charge is that the bundle interpretation contradicts God’s simplicity, indivisibility, unity, and nonderivativeness. In addition to arguing that Spinoza is explicit in his endorsement of the bundle interpretation to which his system commits him, in this paper I explain how such an interpretation harmonizes with various Spinozistic positions said to be in tension with it—the ones just mentioned as well as others related: the “sameness” of God’s attributes, the unity of parallel modes of different attributes, our being able to know God by knowing just one of his attributes, and so on. Through the help of mapping out how God’s attributes relate to one another in terms of Suárez’s famous taxonomy of distinctions, I explain, moreover, how my interpretation provides solutions to certain famous criticisms of Spinoza’s philosophy, perhaps most importantly Leibniz’s objection to Spinoza’s ontological argument and Tschirnhaus’s puzzlement over Spinoza’s claim that Thought is the same as any other attribute even though it is more replete than any other attribute.
“Spinoza’s Bundle Analysis of Substances Having Attributes.” InCircolo: Rivista di Filosofia e Culture 9 (2020). 137-185.