A Cosmo-Ontological Case for God
Check out this paper, originally published in Philosophical Forum, that argues for the existence of a maximally perfect wellspring of absolutely everything (including itself).
In Homage to Descartes and Spinoza: A Cosmo-Ontological Case for God
See the full paper here.
Abstract.—Integrating cosmological and ontological lines of reasoning, I argue that there is a self-necessary being that (a) serves as the sufficient condition for everything, that (b) has the most perfect collection of whatever attributes of perfection there might be, and that (c) is an independent, eternal, unique, simple, indivisible, immutable, all-actual, all-free, all-present, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, personal creator of every expression of itself that everything is. My cosmo-ontological case for such a being, an everything-maker with the core features ascribed to the God of classical theism, addresses the standard worries plaguing these lines of reasoning: (1) the richness required of such a being dissolves it into many beings; (2) the metaphysical possibility of such a being is assumed on insufficient grounds; (3) the features we ascribe to such a being are mere human-all-too-human projections.
Section 1. Introductory Remarks
Section 1.1 Overview
In this paper I argue that there is a maximally perfect being with the core features of the God of classical theism. I argue, in other words, that there is a self-necessary being that (a) serves as the sufficient condition for everything, that (b) has the most perfect collection of whatever attributes of perfection there are, and that (c) is alpha: an independent, eternal, unique, simple, indivisible, immutable, all-actual, all-free, all-present, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, personal creator of every expression of itself that everything is.
To support the claim that there is, first of all, a being that suffices for itself and everything else, in section 2.2 and 2.4 I develop a cosmological line of reasoning. By incorporating proofs for the oneness of that being, my line of reasoning preempts the standard objection: namely, that the richness required of such a being dissolves it into many beings. To support the claim that there is, second of all, a self-necessary being with the most perfect collection of whatever attributes of perfection there might be, in section 2.3 I develop an ontological line of reasoning. By incorporating proofs for the metaphysical possibility of such a being in the first place, my line of reasoning preempts the standard objection: namely, that the metaphysical possibility of such a being is assumed either without evidence or else with evidence merely for the epistemic or logical possibility of such a being. After demonstrating that the being of sections 2.2 and 2.4, on the one hand, and the being of section 2.3, on the other hand, are one and the same, in section 3 I catalogue that being’s principal features. By teasing out what features are entailed by its being merely the wellspring of everything (and so allowing the fact of its being “maximally perfect” to play no role in my analysis), my line of reasoning preempts the standard objection: namely, that we treat such a being as a canvas on which to project our all-too-human notions of perfection. The ultimate wellspring, so I find, has the central characteristics of the being of all possible beings: being itself—and perhaps simply is being itself.
Section 1.2. Brief Background[1]
First, I use the term “cause” in the broad sense of that which explains why something is the case.
Second, I use the terms “being” and “thing” and “entity” and the like in a sense broad enough to encompass every reality (events, properties, possibilities—whatever is real).
Third, what is sufficient for o guarantees o, such that o obtains whenever what is sufficient for o obtains.
Fourth, sufficient causation is necessarily transitive: if x suffices for y such that y necessarily obtains whenever x obtains, and if y suffices for z such that z necessarily obtains whenever y obtains, then x suffices for z such that z necessarily obtains whenever x obtains.
Fifth, there are only three options when it comes to something, A, obtaining. (1) A is other-caused, that is, A is caused by something nonidentical to A (and so exists ab alio). (2) A is self-caused, that is, A is caused by A itself (and so exists a se). (3) A is uncaused, that is, A is caused neither by its own being nor by some other being but rather by nonbeing (and so exists ex nihilo).
Sixth, the uncaused category is necessarily empty.[2] Elsewhere I develop a nuanced and sustained defense of the point (see Istvan, 2020a, sections 2 and 5.1), but consider the central reason. To deny that the uncaused category is empty is to say the absurd: that something, x, has reality even though reality—reality all-things-considered (and so including x itself)—does not ultimately suffice for x to have reality in the first place. Something cannot be generated from power-bereft metaphysical nothing—from metaphysical nothing, that is, in a way that does not mean that it is generated from itself. Ex nihilo, in other words, nihil fit: from nothing—which does not have any powers or laws or information—nothing comes, nothing is excreted.
Seventh, when it comes to that which is self-caused, that is, that which has in itself the resources for a full explanation of why it is, there are three main starting options (see Istvan, 2011a, pp. 404–405). The first two are absurd. The third is not.
According to the first option, that which is self-caused is that which exists before it exists in order to cause itself to exist. To say that something exists before it exists in the way meant here (namely, where the sense of the word “exists” is exactly the same both times it is said) is clearly a contradiction.[3] Talking about a self-caused thing existing before it exists is absurd for another reason too, at least on the assumption that the term “before” here is temporal (rather than ontological). This additional reason is important to mention if only to inform our understanding of the third sense of self-causation to be discussed later. Since what suffices for x guarantees x (see point 3), A being the sufficient condition for itself to be at all, which it would be were it self-caused, would make A always already in existence—a necessary-permanent fixture of reality (rather than something whose existence was preceded by a time in which it did not exist).
According to the second option, that which is self-caused is that which causes itself to exist at the very same moment that it comes to exist in the first place. The second sense of self-causation, aside from being unintuitive and superfluous (since the very resources used to pop the thing up at some moment pop up at the very same moment in which the thing has already popped up), is absurd as well. Understood in a certain way, yes: the second problem I raised for the first sense of self-causation applies here as well. But there is another problem that rules out the second sense, no matter how it is understood. Before the thing in question exists either it has the power to bring itself into existence or it does not. If before it exists it has the power to bring itself into existence, then—since actually having the power to do something requires existing—we are confronted with the absurdity of the first option: the thing exists before it exists. If before it exists it does not have the power to bring itself into existence, then what gave it the power? The power could have come only from itself or from nonbeing or from some being nonidentical to it. But the from-itself option would just put the question off one step and the from-nonbeing option is impossible (see point 6). The power in question, therefore, must come from some being nonidentical to the being in question. But then the being in question is other-caused rather than self-caused.
According to the third option, that which is self-caused is that which is necessary in virtue of existing by its very definition—self-necessary, in a phrase.[4] The third sense of self-causation, necessary-permanent self-causation, amounts to being causa sui in the way that God is for Descartes and Spinoza (see Spinoza, 1985, pp. 38–39, 408, 412, 439; Descartes, 1997, pp. 175–176, 213; Istvan, 2020a, especially section 2). For something to be self-caused in the third sense, that is to say, is for it to be the non-passive and immanent and complete and ultimate archē of itself in the sense of having an essence that—rather than just happening to be instantiated—all by itself guarantees that it is instantiated. For something to be self-caused in the third sense, in other words, is for it to be a such (sense, character, quality, content) that is intrinsically a this in the sense of having an essence that cannot truly be conceived except as existing—having an essence that cannot truly be conceived except as existing, however, not in the “victim sense” that the being with that essence just so happens always already to exist, but rather in the “empowered sense” that its essence inherently involves existence. For something to be self-caused in the third sense, to put it one final way, is for it to be explanatorily on even-footing with itself in the sense of existing—not for no reason whatsoever, but rather—by the necessity of its own nature.
The unifying problem with the other two notions of self-causation is that, as Spinoza puts it, “no thing . . . has in itself a cause enabling it . . . . to make itself (if it does not exist)” (1985, p. 147 I/110/13–17).[5] But self-causation in the Spinoza-friendly third sense, according to which the very nature of that which is self-caused guarantees that it cannot fail to exist, does not amount to the contradiction of something having the power to beget itself even when it does not exist. Since it honors the fact that nothing can be explanatorily prior to itself, and since it honors the fact that what is self-caused must be a necessary-permanent fixture of reality, and since it honors the fact that nothing has in itself the power to make itself when it does not exist, the third option avoids what makes the other two absurd.
Is the third sense of self-causation viable? First, in addition to it not being contradictory in any blatant way, the third sense is not empty (despite the overhyped Humean-Kantian worry). There is a difference between saying something just so happens to exist and saying that existence is intrinsic to its essence: that which exists by its essence is a necessary being always already in place![6] Second, and most importantly, there is at least one thing that is self-caused in the third sense, as I argue throughout this paper (and as Descartes, Spinoza, and—since to be self-caused in this third sense is simply to exist in the a-se manner of God—virtually every classical theist at least implicitly agrees).
Eighth, I follow the Cartesian way of speaking: God is most appropriately described as self-caused (that is, brute in the virtuous-empowered sense of existing by the necessity of its own nature) rather than uncaused (that is, brute in the vicious-lame sense of having reality despite reality ultimately failing to be enough for it to have reality). To be sure, Aquinas sees things through a lens according to which it is inappropriate to call God “self-caused” (see 1975, I/13/iv; 1964, I/2/iii). But Aquinas has in mind the two repugnant senses of self-causation (see point 7) and he construes God’s being uncaused in the way that the great rationalists construe God’s being self-caused: namely, God’s not being other-caused and so, for reasons described in points 5-7, God’s being the adequate immanent condition of itself in the sense of having an essence that involves existence. In effect, the disagreement between Aquinas (and his followers), on the one hand, and Descartes (and his followers), on the other, is largely verbal.[7] The Cartesian way of speaking, which best aligns with the proper meaning of “Yahweh-Asher-Yahweh” (that which brings into existence whatever exists), I find to be more precise, however (and it avoids the repugnancy of saying that God has reality even though reality—reality all-things-considered (and so including God itself)—does not ultimately suffice for God to have reality in the first place). Talk of God being causa sui is, as Jerome makes clear in his commentary on Ephesians 3:15, a way to highlight God’s aseity while honoring the deep principle that nothing comes from nothing and the deep intuition that God, in particular, cannot be thrown into this, like this—even thrown into this, like this, from eternity—in a way not up to God.[8]
Notes
[1] The foundational points that follow—especially points 3, 4, and 6—I defend in detail elsewhere (see Istvan, 2020a, section 2).
[2] This claim is a corollary of—or, perhaps better put, simply another way of stating—the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), the principle according to which there is a sufficient explanation for why whatever obtains obtains such that all things—in light of point 5—are either (1) explained by themselves (self-caused, causa sui) or (2) explained by an other (other-caused, causa aliena).
[3] To evade the contradiction of saying that something exists before it exists, one would have to say that the cause and the effect here are nonidentical. But then we are no longer dealing with self-causation. One may insist, on the contrary, that we are still dealing with self-causation even though cause and effect are nonidentical. After all, (1) sufficient causation is transitive (see point 4 in section 1.2) and (2) the cause, A, sufficiently causes the effect, B, and B sufficiently causes A, in which case A sufficiently causes A. The problem is that an effect that is nonidentical to its sufficient cause cannot be the sufficient cause of that cause. Sufficient causation, that is to say, is patently irreflexive when there are genuine steps. To say that sufficient causation could be reflexive even while involving genuine steps is to say that A could sufficiently cause itself by way of sufficiently causing something nonidentical to itself, something to which it should be identical if it really is the sufficient cause of A and if A, through it, really is the sufficient cause of itself.
[4] I use the terms “self-necessary” and “self-dependent” interchangeably with “self-caused” throughout this paper.
[5] The problem with the other two notions of self-causation is that, as Aquinas puts the same point in Aristotelean terms, “the same thing cannot be at once in act and in potency [in the same sense]” because that would mean, absurdly, that it is actual and yet merely possible, and so is and yet is not, in the same respect (1975, p. 88 I/13/iv).
[6] Yes, the list of what you look for in a romantic partner—rich, athletic, outgoing—would typically be exactly the same whether you included existing in it or not. I say “typically” because if you included existing in the sense that you want your candidate partner to exist by her essence, the list would be different. Including existence in that sense would mean that you want not just a rich, athletic, and outgoing person (who of course exists), but a rich, athletic, and outgoing person who always already exists: a self-necessary rich, athletic, and outgoing person!
[7] Indeed, just as the only viable sense of x being self-caused entails that x is a permanent fixture of reality, the only viable sense of x being uncaused entails the same (see Istvan, 2020a, section 2), in which case at least the look, so to say, of an uncaused God is indiscernible from the look of a self-caused God.
[8] “Other things receive their substance by the mediation of God, but God—who always is and does not have his beginning from another source but is himself the origin of himself and the cause of his own substance—cannot be understood to have something which has existence from another source.”
“In Homage to Descartes and Spinoza: A Cosmo-Ontological Case for God.” The Philosophical Forum 52.1 (2021). 41-64.
